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ARGUMENT 
I. ONE-WAY TELEPHONE PAGING HAS LONG BEEN REGU-
LATED UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH 
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANY DEREGULA-
TION THEREOF MUST BE IN STRICT ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE APPLICABLE STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS. 
A. The Commission has Interpreted its 
Jurisdictional Authority to Include 
One-Way Paging Services. 
A critical difference of opinion exists between the 
parties to this appeal with respect to how the Utah Public Serv-
ice Commission's ("Commission") regulation of the one-way tele-
phone paging industry for over twenty years should be character-
ized. The Commission and American Paging, Inc. of Utah ("Ameri-
can Paging") argue that the Commission never had jurisdiction, 
and thus, whatever it was the Commission did for twenty years 
could not be regulation. They argue that it was only in 1983 
that the Commission first took any action which construed its 
jurisdiction over one-way paging. They refer, of course, to the 
letter issued on June 3, 1983 by the Commission to American Pag-
ing denying jurisdiction over one-way paging. That letter was 
the subject of the appeal in Williams v. Public Service Commis-
sion, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986), the predecessor case to the pre-
sent action. 
-1-
Both the Commission and American Paging attempt to 
characterize the Commission's long history of granting and deny-
ing certificates for paging services, extracting utility taxes, 
requiring publication and filing of tariffs and generally placing 
on providers of one-way paging services the regulatory burdens to 
which utilities are subject, as simply fallout from the 
Commission's inadvertence or "unwitting regulation". The Com-
mission and American Paging seek to persuade this Court to ignore 
the Commission's long-standing practice of regulating one-way 
paging with statements such as the following: 
The Commission cannot acquire such authority 
merely by passage of time or by unauthorized 
issuance of certificates. 
Brief of Commission at p.6 (emphasis added). 
Furthermore, the PSCU's accession to requests 
for certificates of authority to operate 
one-way paging services was mostly inciden-
tal. The facts reflect that the PSCU's mere 
consent to grant certain requests for cer-
tificates of authority to operate one-way 
services was only sporadic, and was actually 
an unwitting violation of statutory authori-
ty. 
Brief of American Paging at pp. 9-10 (emphasis added). 
Respondents emphasize that the Commission never issued 
a formal order specifically declaring its jurisdiction over pag-
ing services. That implies necessarily that respondents are of 
the opinion that twenty years of active and vigorous regulation 
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should simply be ignored rather than viewed as an exercise of 
jurisdiction and an interpretation of the governing statutes. 
This Court previously rejected that argument in Williams v, Pub-
lic Service Commission, supra, as being without merit. 720 P.2d 
at 776. 
American Paging seriously misconstrues this Court's 
opinion in Williams by implying in its "Statement of Facts" that 
the Court made the following factual finding: 
The prior unwitting grant of authority did not consti-
tute an interpretation of jurisdiction, but rather, was 
simply an assent to requests for certificates of con-
venience and necessity. 
American Paging brief at p. 2. Petitioner submits that this 
Court made no such finding. In fact, in Williams, this Court 
held: "For over twenty years, the Commission has interpreted its 
authority over telephone corporations to include one-way paging 
services." 720 P. 2d at 776. Moreover, this Court declared that 
the Commission cannot reverse its long-settled position regarding 
the scope of its jurisdiction without complying with the 
appropriate procedural requirements. Id. at 777. Those 
requirements were not satisfied in Williams and they are not 
satisfied in this case. 
It is almost incomprehensible that respondents actually 
maintain that the Commission never exercised jurisdiction over 
one-way paging services so as to bring that industry within the 
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scope of regulated utilities. Had that been the case, surely the 
Court in Williams would have ended the dispute with a decisive 
ruling to that effect. Instead, the Court found that the Com-
mission improperly attempted to "deregulate" a long regulated 
service. Jjd. at 776-77. 
It is somewhat ironic that at the same time respondents 
are arguing that the Commission's "unwitting" regulation should 
be ignored, they are also arguing that it is the Commission's 
expertise and experience that should be given deference when 
examining the "rule making" procedure challenged by Williams. In 
other words, when it serves their purpose, respondents readily 
denounce the Commission's actions as being "unwitting," "inci-
dental," or "in violation of statutory authority," but are quick 
to hear Id the Commission as the body empowered and equipped to 
address the jurisdictional issue when the desired goal is 
achieved—namely, deregulation. Petitioner maintains that if 
deference is to be given to the Commission's actions and rulings, 
it must apply equally to a twenty year history of consistant 
regulation and the policy consequences which follow. 
Petitioner Williams maintains that this case must be 
evaluated and decided based on the premise that the Commission 
previously interpreted its jurisdiction to include one-way paging 
services. Accepting that premise, respondents' arguments con-
cerning the various positions taken in other jurisdictions with 
respect to the issue of whether paging services are utilities 
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subject to regulation are rendered moot — that determination 
having already been made in Utah. Likewise, concerns about the 
broad, over-reaching impact of such an interpretation on other 
aspects of the telecommunication industry, such as answering 
machines, telephone directories, etc., are unfounded since the 
Commission's exercise of jurisdiction extended only to paging 
services. Petitioner has never argued that the Commission's 
actions require expansion of jurisdiction over activities it has 
not previously regulated. 
B. In Order for the Commission to Deregu-
late One-Way Paging the Applicable 
Procedural and Substantive Requirements 
must be Satisfied. 
In Williams, this Court stated: 
Petioners allege, inter alia, that the Com-
mission did not follow proper administrative 
procedures in concluding that it lacked 
jurisdiction. We agree that the Commission 
failed to adhere to proper requirements in 
ruling on the jurisdictional issue, and 
accordingly reverse and remand for a new 
hearing that comports with the applicable 
statutes. 
720 P. 2d at 773-74 (emphasis added). At the time Williams was 
argued and decided, the Utah Administrative Rule Making Act and 
the Public Utilities Act appeared to be the most pertinent 
statutes. The Court conclude that the Administrative Rule Making 
Act was the most applicable, held that its requirements had not 
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been satisfied and speculated that on remand a rule making 
proceeding would be followed by the Commission. 
During the appeal process in Williams but before the 
adoption of Rule 8304 by the Commission, the Legislature enacted 
the Public Telecommunications Act, Utah Code Ann. § 54~8b-l et 
seq. (Supp. 1985) clarifying the Commission's authority to regu-
late telecommunication services and providing a specific proce-
dure for the deregulation or exemption of services which had 
previously been regulated. Petitioner Williams does not seek (as 
suggested by respondents in their briefs) to slide paging ser-
vices within the ambit of regulation by requesting this Court to 
enlarge the Commission's jurisdiction pursuant to § 54-8b-2. 
Rather, accepting the premise advocated by petitioner that paging 
was already a regulated service, Chapter 8b comes into play only 
to the extent it provides a procedure for deregulating or 
exempting a regulated service. Petitioner does not seek an 
expansion of jurisdiction to include paging, but rather recogni-
tion of prior regulation and adherence to applicable statutory 
requirements in attempts to deregulate. 
Perhaps "unwittingly," the Commission and American 
Paging conceed the applicability of Chapter 54-8b to the present 
case. At page 33 of its brief, American Paging states: 
Third, the explicit purpose of Chapter 54-8b 
is to deregulate telecommunications services 
over which the PSCU now has statutory juris-
diction and which exist in a competitive 
environment. 
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The Commission states at page 9 of its brief that the purpose of 
the Act is to: 
provide a method for exempting any telecom-
munication service from regulation over which 
the Commission had jurisdiction under prior 
existing law. 
The Commission and American Paging both admit that the 
exemption or deregulation procedure provided for in Utah Code 
Ann. S 54-8b-3 was not followed in the present case even though 
it was in full force and effect at the time Rule 8304 was adopt-
ed. American Paging at page 7 of its brief states: "The PSCU 
did not engage in exemption proceedings under Chapter 8b of the 
Telecommunications Act." The only reason advanced by respondents 
for not applying the Act is their erroneous argument that the 
Commission has never regulated paging services. Failure to com-
ply with that procedure requires that Rule 8304 be found void and 
of no effect and that the American Paging order be reversed. 
II. PETITIONER DOES NOT DISPUTE THE POSSIBILITY OF 
DEREGULATION BUT MAINTAINS THAT ADMINISTRATIVE 
FIAT IS AN UNACCEPTABLE METHOD OF ACCOMPLISHING 
DEREGULATION. 
The Commission and American Paging misconstrue 
Williams' arguments regarding estoppel and abandonment of 
long-standing policy interpretations. They attempt to distin-
guish Husky Oil Co. v. State Tax Commission, 556 P.2d 1268 (Utah 
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1976) and Celebrity Cluby Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Commission, 
602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) by arguing that since those decisions do 
not involve determinations of jurisdiction, they are wholly 
inapplicable to the facts of the present case. To the contrary, 
it is the broader principles advanced by those decisions that are 
compelling in this case. Husky Oil stands for the proposition 
that "radical departures from administrative interpretation con-
sistently followed cannot be made except for the most cogent 
reasons." 556 P.2d at 1271 (emphasis added). Never, not even in 
the Commission's adoption of Rule 8304, have any reasons, let 
alone cogent reasons, been given for reversal of the Commission's 
long-standing practice of regulating paging services. The Com-
mission cannot articulate any cogent reasons for reversing its 
position because it refuses to even acknowledge that it ever had 
jurisdiction. Even if the correct procedural steps are followed, 
they must result in findings which satisfy the cogency require-
ment of Husky Oil before the Commission can reverse its position. 
Celebrity Club, on the other hand, is cited by Williams 
for the proposition that once an administrative agency acts or 
speaks so as to invoke reliance on those actions by some other 
party which results in injury to that party, the agency may be 
estopped from denying or altering those prior acts or statements. 
Here, the Commission is estopped from denying its jurisdiction 
over one-way paging. If, through appropriate procedures (com-
pliance with the Public Telecommunications Act), deregulation is 
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deemed appropriate for one-way paging based on specific findings 
and reasons which are cogent, then the Commission might be able 
to overcome the estoppel argument. However, the Commission is 
clearly estopped from denying its prior exercise of jurisdiction 
for the purpose of adopting a rule rejecting jurisdiction based 
solely on that denial. If paging services are to be deregulated, 
the Commission must acknowledge the regulated status of the 
industry and deal with it accordingly. It cannot simply pretend 
it never had jurisdiction. 
III. THE RULE-MAKING PROCEEDING FAILED TO SATISFY 
CRITICAL NOTICE REQUIREMENTS. 
When Chairman Cameron gave notice of the rule-making 
proceeding in the separate and ancillary one-way paging hearing, 
the only certificated one-way paging carriers present were David 
R. Williams and Mobile Telephone Company, who were present at the 
hearing through their respective attorneys. Not present or par-
ties to those proceedings were the other two certificated one-way 
paging carriers. One of those was Royce Electronics to which 
reference is made in the Commission's brief. The other is Mobile 
Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc. Although the Commission has 
attempted, post-hearing, and as part of its brief to render this 
failure to comply with the notice requirement as harmless error 
by ex parte contact with Mr. Royce Henningson and the preparation 
and submission of his affidavit, it ignored completely, even at 
this late date, the fourth certificated carrier, Mobile Telephone 
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of Southern Utah, Inc. See Williams, 720 P.2d at 775. In view 
of the Commission's diligence in seeking out Royce Henningson, we 
assume that its failure to supply a similar affidavit from Mobile 
Telephone of Southern Utah, Inc. is due to its inability to 
obtain such an affidavit. 
IV. EVEN IF THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE RULE-MAKING 
PROCEDURE HAD BEEN COMPLIED WITH RULE NO. 8 3 04 
WOULD STILL BE VOID AS UNSUPPORTED BY ANY FINDINGS 
OR COGENT REASONS. 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court is somehow able to 
overlook the inadequate notice given in the rule-making proceed-
ing, Rule No. 8304 is still void as a matter of law because it is 
not based on any findings or reasons which satisfy the cogency 
requirement of Husky Oil. Furthermore, the enactment of the 
Public Telecommunications Act cannot simply be ignored. The 
specific provisions of Utah Code Ann. S 54-8b-3(2) require that 
the Commission, before exempting any telecommunication service 
from regulation, hold a hearing, make specific findings and issue 
an order stating the terms and ocnditions for the exemption. 
Notwithstanding objections filed by petitioner, the Commission 
failed to satisfy those requirements in its purported rule-making 
proceeding. Rule No. 8304 is, therefore, void as a matter of 
law. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above and in Petitioner 
Williams* opening brief, Commission Rule No. 8304 should be 
vacated and the Commission's order of dismissal in Case No. 
85-2007-01 should be reversed. / 
Respectfully submitted this $Lf —' day of November, 
1986. 
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